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BOOK REVIEWS
Problems of Religious Diversity by Paul Griffiths Blackwell, 2001 xvi + 176.
Paper $26.95
ROBERT MCKIM, University of Illinois, Urbana
This engaging and clearly written book deals with these important topics:
attitudes to the truth of the claims of religious traditions other than one's
own; whether one's degree of epistemic confidence in the claims of one's
own tradition should be diminished in virtue of acquaintance with other
traditions; what attitude one should have to members of other traditions;
and what attitude one should have to their salvific prospects. In each of
these areas Griffiths outlines alternatives, making useful and sometimes
original distinctions and moves.
Griffiths emphasizes the differences between how things look to the
nonreligious, on the one hand, and to the religiously committed, on the
other, displaying in the process a pleasing sense of the complexity of actual
traditions and of the variety of resources they have at their disposal. He
also makes some reconunendations, indicating what he thinks should be
the responses of his own tradition, Ron1.an Catholic Christianity, and some-
limes of Christianity as a whole. Briefly, these are as folIows.
Truth. He says that "for Christians (and not just Catho1ic Christians) ...
open inclusivism ... [is] the correct [and best] position." (64) Open inclu-
sivism of the sort that he advocates is the view that one's own religion
teaches more truths, or teaches them more fully, than does any other reli-
gion, but that it is possible that another tradition makes true claims that are
not yet explicitly recognized by one's own tradition. In explaining why he
thinks that, for Catho1ics, in particular, open inclusivism is the best option,
he says that "the Church has not yet given explicit formulation to all the
religiously significant truths implied by the revelation she preserves and
transmits ... [and] may be prompted to formulate and teach what it has not
previously formulated and taught by coming to know of truths discovered
and taught by those outside its bOllndaries" (62-3). So what we have here
extends only to an openness to learning from others truths that are already
"implicit" in the deposit of faith received by the Church. Indeed, he says
that it is merely possible that others possess such truths. He does not say
that they do so. Nor does he provide an example of anything that his tra-
dition 11.as actually leamed from another re1igious tradition.
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Epistemic confidence (or confidence that one's beliefs amount to knowl-
edge). Griffiths' view is that whether Christians should significantly
reduce epistemic confidence in Christian doctrine in response to the fact
that there are others who disagree depends on whether they can explain
(or rather explain away) this fact. His own judgment is that "Christians
ought to be moderately epistemically troubled by knowledge of deep reli-
gious diversity" (96). Also "the epistemic uneasiness often (and properly)
produced by increasing Christian awareness of deep diversity should be
acknowledged as a neuralgic point of creative conceptual growth for
Christian thought, of the same order of importance, perhaps, as is attention
to the question of apparently unmerited suffering." (97)
Attitudes to others Here Griffiths distinguishes tl1Tee responses: tolerance
of others, separation of one's own group from other groups, and evange-
lism. And he opts for evangelism, drawing on Pope John Paul II's encycli-
calletter Redemptoris Missio, according to which "the missionary thrust ...
belongs to the very nature of the Christian life" (132).
Salvation. Griffiths' opinion is that "the grammar and syntax of ortho-
dox Christian thought strongly suggests that some version of exclusivism
(about salvation) must be affirmed; and that restrictivism (at least in its
more extreme versions) must simultaneously be denied." (161) What this
amounts to is that belonging to Christianity is necessary for salvation but
there is no basis for saying that there is anyone who will not be saved.
This is partly because someone who refuses God's offer of salvation in this
life might not do so etemally. It is also because Griffiths favors a relaxed
reading of "belonging to Christianity" that does not require explicit,
observable, card-carrying participation and that indeed leaves open the
possibility that members of other traditions belong to Christianity and
hence may meet this requirement for salvation.
These are rather conservative responses. (However, there are nuances
that need to be noted. As we have seen, open inclusivism about truth does
not extend to learning anything new and hence is rather closed; on the
other hand, Griffiths' exclusivism about salvation is rather inclusive.)
Griffith's general conservatism is also manifested as follows. He says that
the claim "God loves me", like the claim "n1Y wife exists", is "entirely insu-
lated from argument, which is roughly to say that I would reject any argu-
ment whose conclusion was that either of these claims is false solelyon the
ground that it had such a conclusion." (47) Such claims are, for hirn,
in1ffiune to evidence or argument, or non-negotiable. Presumably he does
not merely report here on an interesting fact about hirnself. He thinks that
he is not going wrong in any way in this regard. He is neither irrational
nor in any other undesirable state in virtue of taking this position.
The question immediately arises: Does Griffiths think that counterparts
to these responses in the fOllr key areas are appropriate in the case of other,
or some other, traditions? Should Methodists, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists,
Muslims, Bah'ai, and so forth, respond in such ways as these when they
encounter other groups and their views - including, of course, the Catholic
Christian views espoused by Griffiths? Is this one size that fits all?
His answer has two parts. On the one hand he endorses some general
principles that bear on how all, or at least many, traditions should respond
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to the fact of religious diversity. But he also thinks that it is in virtue of var-
ious internal resources that it has at its disposal that the Catholic tradition
should respond as he thinks it should. And he thinks that other traditions
should, in turn, be guided by their internal resources. He takes the ways in
which people do respond as a guide to how they should respond.
The general principles are, 1 think, to be filtered through the internal
resources of each tradition, thereby yielding religion-specific guidelines.
Consider his conclusions conceming epistemic confidence. He asks this
question, which certainly is stated in a sufficiently general way that it bears
on all religious traditions: "Does (or should) coming to know of religious
diversity reduce or remove religious people's epistemic confidence in the
religious assertions they find themselves making?" (17) (I will just pass
over the fact that the normative part of this line of enquiry sits uneasily
with his view th.at we are unable to exercise voluntary control over our
assents.)
Griffiths begins his answer to this question by introducing the following
general principle (72f.). The extent to which the epistemic confidence with
which you hold a belief should be diminished when you encounter dis-
agreement should be determined by the following:
your initial degree of confidence in the belief;
the apparent trustworthiness and authoritativeness of those who
disagree;
and the extent to which the disagreement of others can be
accounted for.
Next we need to turn to what a particular tradition actually says about
these matters. ("There is no single and unavoidable answer to the question
of how inhabitants of a religious form of life ought to respond, epistemical-
ly speaking, to their coming to know of irreducible diversity in religious
assent" (75; also 97).
First, in Griffiths' view, religious beliefs are, by definition, held with
great confidence.
Second, Griffith says initially that the perceived trustworthiness and
authoritativeness of others will be a function of th.e extent to which they are
morally admirable. And his reasonable and generous assessment is that
there are many people in other religious traditions who are very admirable
in this regard. Hence they, and their teachings, should be taken seriously
(78). However, if one's tradition does not teach that good moral citizenship
makes for religious insight, one will not be in the least troubled by the fact
that morally admirable outsiders hold beliefs that are incompalible with
the horne beliefs (79). Since most traditions do not consider outsiders,
however morally admirable, to be trustworthy and authoritative on reli-
gious matters, the significance of the fact of disagreement is accordingly
diminished.
Third, numerous religious traditions have ways of accounting for how it
is that others disagree - ways that seem plausible to insiders. Thus out-
siders are said to be sinful, or not to have received the requisite revelation,
or to have misunderstood or rejected that revelalion, or to be ignorant, or
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self-deceived, and so on. The variety of finger-pointing maneuvers is
familiar to all of uso
So when the general principle concerning epistemic confidence is com-
bined with the resources of any of the religious traditions, it seems that the
fact of religious disagreement will provide people in any of those traditions
with little reason to diminish the confidence with which they hold their
beliefs. Broadly speaking, the presence of a variety of traditions should,
according to Griffiths, not make much difference to a particular tradition
unless that tradition says that it should do so.
Moreover, some traditions dismiss other traditions as, for example, the
work of the devil. If we simply consider what they ought to do to be a
matter of what they actually do, then of course traditions that do respond
in such ways are right to do so.
As we have seen, Griffiths says that "Christians ought to be moderately
epistemically troubled by knowledge of deep religious diversity" and that
this knowledge should be a "neuralgic point of creative conceptual
growth". However, the exact way in which the general principle discussed
above combined with the relevant resources of the Christian tradition yield
this outcome (rather than, say, the result that Christians ought not to be
epistemically troubled at all by knowledge of deep religious diversity) is
not explained. Furthermore, what do being moderately epistemically trou-
bled and being an occasion for conceptual growth amount to? For exam-
pIe, can you be troubled in the relevant sense about a belief and yet hold it
in the non-negotiable way mentioned above?
A few final points:
1. The attitudes to outsiders considered here are tolerance, separation
and evangelism. Absent from this list is, for example, the possibility of a
respectful, exploratory, curious and courteous eagerness to understand
others and their views. This lacuna is striking given Griffiths' own efforts
and approach, both in other academic work and in his professional life,
which often seems to display just such a commendable and generous atti-
tude to other traditions. [Approved/offered by author]
2. If it is right for Griffiths' tradition to evangelize, then presumably it
also is right for others to do so, assuming that their tradition has internal
resources that tell them that they should do so. Is this mutual religious
head-butting really the best we can do?
3. In what sense were the modem evolutionary and cosmological dis-
coveries that the Catholic tradition has embraced already present in the tra-
dition? (These are the only cases mentioned in which Griffiths' tradition
has learned anything from without the tradition.) 5urely these are better
understood as cases in which a tradition has learned something genuinely
new.
4. Griffiths says that "[religion] is understood in this book in phenome-
nal terms, which is to say in terms of how forms of life of a certain sort
seem to those who inhabit them" (43). But perhaps examining how things
look from within existing believing communities is not the most reliable
guide to how to respond to an external challenge whose force has not pre-
viously been appreciated by those communities. Griffiths provides a
report on business as usual but perhaps diversity is the sort of problem
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that calls for a change in business as usual. At least the possibility should
be considered that, say, sincere Muslims should rethink their beliefs in
light of the available alternatives - irrespective of what their tradition may
antecedently have had to say about this. The question of what changes
people might need to make is at least as interesting as the question of what
answer they are currently disposed to provide. The conservative approach
advocated here seems to me to exclude from consideration a realistic
appraisal of the significance of religious diversity.
5. Why is it that "[religious] diversity raises some questions about the
epistemic confidence with which religious people do and should treat the
assents they understand to be required of them by belonging to their reli-
gion"(66)? There is a problenl of religious diversity only if you think that
other traditions count for something, have something to offer, are
admirable, might be leamed from, are worth taking seriously, and so forth.
If you think that none of this is so, there is no problem. Griffiths takes the
issue of diversity seriously enough to write a book about it. Yet his
response, in large part, is to say: here are the facts of religious diversity;
and here is the response of my tradition to th.ose facts. End of discussion.
But this should be the beginning of discussion.
I enjoyed reading Griffiths' book. It is a valuable contribution to discus-
sion of its topic and there certainly is much to be learned from it. Yet my
judgment is that it does not respond adequately to the problems with
which it is wrestling.
Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity, by Robert McKim. New York:
Oxford Vniversity Press, 2001. Pp. xi, 280. $47.50.
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, Vniversity of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Robert McKim's book is predicated upon the assumption that "the world is
religiously ambiguous;" "it is possible to interpret the world in a variety of
religious ways, and to interpret it naturalistically," and "to do so without
any loss of rationality" (21).
One consequence of this ambiguity is the divine hiddenness. Part I
explores its nature and implications. After offering reasons for thinking
that God's hiddenness is pervasive, McKim divides theological explana-
tions of it into three types: appeals to human defectiveness, to divine tran-
scendence, and (most important) to the advantages of hiddenness. The fol-
lowing chapters explore these alleged "benefits of mystery"-that "God
must be hidden if we are to be able to make morally sigtuficant choices"
(26), that divine hiddenness is a necessary condition of our freedom to
believe or not believe, that it is apresupposition of trust, worship, and the
like-and assesses the claim that, if God exists, it is reasonable to suppose
that there are goods of mystery that are unknown to uso McKim's conclu-
sion is that (1) while these proposals have their problems, at least some of
them may contribute to an explanation of God's hiddenness and that (2)
"although the mystery that surrounds the nature and existence of God is a
